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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
Charles W. Houpt and Gail N. Houpt, husband and wife ("Houpts"), appeal from a district 
court judgment dismissing their claims for equitable relief and wrongful foreclosure of a deed of 
trust against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and First American Title Company ("Wells Fargo" and 
"F ATCO" and collectively, "Wells"). Houpts argue the court erred by ruling against them on 
motions for summary judgment and reconsideration and awarding attorney fees to Wells. 
B. Course Of Proceedings 
1. Pleadings 
Houpts, grantors of a deed of trust in favor of American Bank of Commerce as beneficiary 
and F ATCO as trustee, filed a Verified Complaint on June 22, 2012, praying for the following relief: 
( a) judgment declaring Wells Fargo is not the beneficiary of the deed of trust; (b) judgment enjoining 
a trustee's sale which scheduled for July 17, 2012; and (c) damages for slander of title. R. Vol. I, 
pp. 18-19. Houpts also moved for a preliminary injunction to stay the foreclosure. Id., pp. 34-35. 
Wells Fargo filed a Verified Answer on July 13, 2012, asserting it owned the beneficial 
interest in the deed of trust and raising defenses including judicial estoppel, waiver, unclean hands, 
and lack of standing. Id., pp. 64-71. FATCO filed a similar Answer. R. Vol. II, pp. 276-81. 
2. Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order 
Houpts' motion for preliminary injunction was heard on September 4, 2012. Ruling from 
the bench, the district court made oral findings of fact, including the following: (a) Wells Fargo had 
purchased the deed of trust and the promissory note it secured ("the Note") in 2004, and was still the 
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Note holder and beneficiary, Tr. p. 87, LL. 1-8, p. 92, LL. 4-12; (b) Houpts had defaulted on the 
Note, Tr. p. 87, LL. 14-15; (c) Houpts filed a bankruptcy petition in February 2011, Id., L.18; and 
(d) The real property encumbered by the deed of trust ("the Property") was still owned by Houpts' 
bankruptcy estate. Id., p. 95, LL. 13-15. It denied Houpts' motion on grounds they lacked sufficient 
interest in the Property to enjoin the trustee's sale, and were estopped from denying Wells Fargo was 
their creditor: 
[Houpts] previously accepted the position that Wells Fargo Bank was 
their secured creditor, ... [and] received the benefits of that 
transaction, and it would now be inconsistent to allow [Houpts] to 
maintain a position that Wells Fargo bank is not the holder, the owner 
of the note and entitled to foreclose. 
Id. p. 96, LL. 11-18; p. 98, LL. 3-6. 
3. Stipulation for Voluntary Sale, Interpleader and Intervention 
At Houpts' request, Wells postponed the trustee's sale for several months to give Houpts an 
opportunity to sell the Property voluntarily. Houpts listed the Property and found a buyer. In June 
2013, the parties filed a stipulation to accommodate the sale and deposit the proceeds thereof with 
the clerk. R. Vol. II, pp. 300-05. The district court accepted the stipulation, which also permitted 
three other creditors with liens in the Property to intervene to have their rights adjudicated. Id., pp. 
273-75. The other creditors (not parties to this appeal) intervened and asserted their rights in the 
proceeds. Id., pp. 282-99. 
4. Cross-motions for Summary Judgment 
Wells moved for summary judgment in September 2013, Id., p. 306, arguing that Houpts' 
claims failed because Wells Fargo was the beneficiary of record; and the amount and priority of 
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Wells Fargo's lien entitled it to all of the net sale proceeds. Id., pp. 322-27. Wells Fargo established 
the amount of its lien by affidavit. Id. at pp. 335, 354. Houpts filed a cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment in November 2013, arguing their theory ofrecovery was wrongful foreclosure, 
not slander of title. R. Vol. III, pp. 442,465. They also argued the balance of the Note presented 
a triable issue. Id., pp. 461-63. In reply, Wells argued Houpts' wrongful foreclosure claim failed 
as a matter oflaw because no foreclosure was completed, Houpts lacked standing, and the claim was 
barred by judicial estoppel. R. Vol. IV, pp. 666-75. 
On January 7, 2014, the district court ruled that Houpts' equitable claims were moot because 
Wells Fargo had recorded a written assignment of the beneficiary's interest in the deed of trust and 
because Houpts had voluntarily sold the Property in the interim. Id., p. 756. It further ruled that 
Houpts could not maintain a wrongful foreclosure action because the trustee's sale was canceled. 
Id., p. 761. The court also concluded there was a triable issue of fact "whether the Intervenors were 
good faith purchasers ... whose conveyances were recorded prior to [Wells Fargo's]." Id., p. 765. 
5. Cross-motions for Reconsideration 
Houpts and Wells filed cross-motions for reconsideration later that month. Houpts argued 
Wells Fargo violated Idaho Code § 6-101 and could not obtain a judgment against them. Id., pp. 
779-80. Wells Fargo acknowledged it was not seeking to enforce the Note against Houpts as they 
had discharged their personal liability in bankruptcy. It also argued § 6-101 did not apply to its 
nonjudicial foreclosure, Id., pp. 786-87, and that as an assignee, Wells Fargo held the rights of the 
original beneficiary, notwithstanding the attachment of other liens in the interim. R. Vol. V, p. 83 7. 
Wells also asked for a ruling on the issues of judicial estoppel and standing. Id., p. 859. 
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On those motions, the district court held that judicial estoppel prevented Houpts from 
pursuing their claims which they failed to schedule as assets in their bankrnptcy proceeding. Id., p. 
862. It also ruled that Wells Fargo's lien had priority over the interests ofHoupts and the intervening 
creditors. Id., p. 867. Finally, the court ordered the proceeds from the sale of the Property to be paid 
to Wells Fargo because the amount of its lien exceeded the amount of the proceeds. Id. 
6. Costs 
The court awarded costs including attorney fees to Wells as a contractual right and entered 
judgment against Houpts in the amount of the cost award. Id., pp. 1041, 1055. 
C. Statement Of Facts 
In March 1993, Houpts obtained an SBA-guaranteed loan from American Bank of Commerce 
("ABC"), to make improvements to the Property, a parcel in Bonneville County, Idaho where Houpts 
operated a pet and feed store. R. Vol. II, p. 330, ,r 2, Vol. III, p. 479, ,r,r 3-4. The loan was evidenced 
by the Note, originally dated March 8, 1993 and modified March 31, 1993 in the principal amount 
of $327,800.00, having a maturity date of March 8, 2013. R. Vol. II, pp. 337-40. The Note was 
secured by a first position deed of trust against the Property and a second position deed of trust 
against Houpts' residence, granted in favor of F ATCO as trustee and ABC as beneficiary. R. Vol. 
I, p. 200-02, Vol. II, pp. 330-31; Vol. III, p. 479, ,r,r 5. 
Through a series of mergers, ABC became Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A.. R. Vol. I, 
pp. 67, 195, ,r 3. In 2004, Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A. sold most of its assets and liabilities, 
including the Note and deeds of trust, to Wells Fargo. Id. No written assignment of the deeds of 
trust was recorded at that time. Id. 
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Houpts defaulted on the loan in 2005, then cured their default in 2006 by refinancing their 
home and reducing the balance of the loan by $100,000.00. As part of that transaction, Wells Fargo 
released its deed of trust against Houpts' residence. R. Vol. I, pp. 195-96, ,r,r 6-8, Exhibits B, C. 
Houpts defaulted again in 2007 by missing several monthly payments, and they made no 
payments after November 2009. R. Vol. I, pp. 196, 212-13, R. Vol. II, p. 332. Houpts also failed 
to pay taxes on the Property. Id. As a consequence, in October 2010, Wells Fargo directed FA TCO 
to foreclose. FA TCO recorded a notice of default which identified ABC as the original beneficiary 
but did not refer to the mergers or the assignment to Wells Fargo. Id., R. Vol. III, pp. 520-21. 
To stop the foreclosure, Houpts filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in February 2011. R. 
Vol. II, p. 216, ,r 2. They were represented by counsel throughout the bankruptcy proceedings. R. 
Vol. I, p. 17 5, ,r 1. Houpts filed bankruptcy schedules on February 16, 2011 and amended schedules 
on April 1, 2011, neither of which disclosed any contingent or unliquidated claims of value. R. Vol. 
IV, pp. 681-683. Houpts converted the bankruptcy to a Chapter 13 case but they were unable to 
confirm a plan ofreorganization and the case was converted back to a Chapter 7 proceeding on the 
motion of the Chapter 13 Trustee. R. Vol. II, pp. 234-36. Houpts ultimately discharged $365,669.39 
in debt and their bankruptcy case was closed on September 25, 2013. R. Vol. IV, pp. 688-689. 
In the interim, Wells Fargo obtained stay relief and resumed foreclosure. R. Vol. I, p. 148, 
,r,r 2-3. On March 5, 2012, FATCO recorded an amended notice of default which identified Wells 
Fargo as the current beneficiary. R. Vol. I, p. 3 3. On September 4, 2012, Wells Fargo recorded a 
notice that the deed of trust had been assigned to it by Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A. in 2004. 
R. Vol. III, p. 526, ,r 9, pp. 602-04. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court properly dismiss Houpts' equitable claims as moot? 
2. Did the district court act within its discretion when it ruled Houpts are judicially 
estopped from pursuing a claim for damages which they failed to disclose in their bankruptcy case? 
3. Do Houpts also lack standing as real parties in interest to prosecute their claim in 
damages because that claim belongs to their bankruptcy trustee? 
4. Did the district court act within its discretion in determining that Wells prevailed? 
5. Wells is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § § 
12-120(3) and 12-121, and the terms of the Note and deed of trust. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standards Of Review 
1. This Court reviews the district court's findings of fact for 
clear error and exercises free review over the district court's 
conclusions of/aw. 
Because no jury trial was requested and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment 
on the same evidentiary facts, the district court expressly exercised its power, under Riverside 
Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1°982), to draw what it considered the 
most probable inferences from the uncontroverted facts. R Vol. IV, p. 754, Vol. V, p. 853. "In such 
instances, the appropriate standard of review on appeal is equivalent to the standard of clear error 
prescribed by I.R.C.P. 52(a)." Farm Bureau Ins. Co. ofldaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415,418,234 
P.3d 739, 742 (2010). This Court exercises free review over the district court's conclusions oflaw. 
Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486,489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006). 
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2. The dismissal of Houpt 's claims on the basis of judicial 
estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration, this Court uses the same 
standard applied by the trial court. If the decision was within the trial court's discretion, this Court 
applies an abuse of discretion standard. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 
113 (2012). A dismissal of claims on the basis of judicial estoppel is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,252, 92 P.3d 492,502 (2004). This Court therefore asks 
whether the lower court: (1) rightly perceived the decision to apply judicial estoppel as discretionary; 
(2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable 
to specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Mccallister 
v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891,894,303 P.3d 578,581 (2013). 
3. The district court's determination of prevailing party status 
is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
"The determination of prevailing party status is committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion." Oakes v. Boise Heart 
Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540,542,272 P.3d 512, 515 (2012); I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). 
B. Houpts' Equitable Claims Were Properly Dismissed As Moot. 
1. The district court 'sfindings that Wells Fargo was the 
beneficiary's assignee and Houpts sold the Property 
are supported by substantial, undisputed evidence. 
Under the Ritchie standard, this Court examines the record to determine whether the district 
court's decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. ofldaho 
v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho at 418,234 P.3d at 742. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact 
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would accept and rely on it. Northwest Farm Credit Servs., FLCA v. Lake Cascade Airpark, LLC, 
156 Idaho 758, 763-64, 331 P.3d 500, 505-06 (2014). The district court's findings are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the judgment entered. E.g., Stibal v. Fano, 157 Idaho 428, 337 P.3d 587, 591 
(2014). This Court does not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Ransom v. 
Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641,643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006). 
Exercising the Ritchie Power, the district court found that the notice of the assignment of the 
deed of trust to Wells Fargo was recorded on September 4, 2012. R. Vol. IV, p. 756. That finding 
is undisputed and is supported by evidence submitted by Houpts. R. Vol. III, p. 526, 19, pp. 602-04. 
The district court also found that Houpts voluntarily sold the Property. R. Vol. IV, pp. 754, 756. 
That finding is also supported by the parties' stipulation, R. Vol. II, pp. 300-05, the court's order 
accepting the stipulation, Id., pp. 273-75, the intervention ofHoupts' other secured creditors, Id., pp. 
282-99, and the reimbursement to Wells Fargo for property taxes it had paid. Id., p 332, 1 16. 
Houpts do not challenge these findings. Indeed, they acknowledge the date Wells Fargo's 
assignment was recorded and do not dispute that they voluntarily sold the Property. Appellants' 
Brief at pp. 7-8, 22-23. Houpts argue the district court erred in not considering other evidence, Id. 
at 21, but do not explain how that evidence creates a triable issue. In any event, this Court does not 
replace the trial court's findings of fact by reweighing the evidence. Idaho Dep't of Health & 
Welfare, Mental Health Servs. v. Doe, 157 Idaho 274,335 P.3d 614,619 (Ct. App. 2014), review 
denied (Oct. 23, 2014). Houpts have therefore failed to prove error in the district court's findings 
of fact. 
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2. The district court's findings support its conclusion that 
Houpts' equitable claims are moot. 
Based on its findings, the district court ruled that Houpts' claims for equitable relief had 
become moot. R. Vol. IV, p. 756. An claim becomes moot if it no longer presents a real and 
substantial controversy capable of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief. 
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851, 119 P.3d 624, 626 
(2005). A claim on appeal is moot when an appellant no longer has a legal interest in the outcome. 
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 682, 99 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2004) (citing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 
478, 481-82 (1982). 
More specifically, equitable claims arising out of the plaintiffs ownership of real property 
become moot when the property is sold to a third party . .l1&., Evans v. Family Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
481 A.2d 1309, 1310 (D.C.1984) (affirming dismissal of a claim to enjoin a foreclosure because the 
purchase of the property by a third party divested appellant of any interest in the property); Fields 
v. Millsap & Singer, P.C., 295 S.W.3d 567,570 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (dismissing as moot plaintiffs' 
appeal of summary judgment against them on quiet title and rescission claims). 
Here, Houpts' claims arose out of their ownership of the Property and relied upon an 
averment that Wells Fargo was not the beneficiary ofrecord. Upon the recording of the assignment 
and Houpts' sale of the Property, those claims became moot as a matter oflaw. The district court's 
dismissal of Houpts' equitable claims should therefore be affirmed. 
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C. Dismissal Of Houpts' Wrongful Foreclosure Claim Was Also Proper. 
I. The district court's findings that Houpts were in 
default and no foreclosure was completed are 
supported by substantial, undisputed evidence. 
The district court found that Houpts defaulted on the Note. Tr. p. 87, LL. 14-15. That 
finding is supported by the affidavit testimony of Wells Fargo's loan officer. R. Vol. I, pp. 196, 212-
13, Vol. II, p. 332, ,i,i 13-14. The court further found that no foreclosure was completed because 
Houpts sold the Property. R. Vol. IV, pp. 749-750. That finding is also supported by substantial 
evidence, as discussed above. R. Vol. II, pp. 273-75, 282-99, 300-05, 332, ,i 16. Houpts do not 
challenge those findings. Rather, they argue there is a question of fact as to whether they were in 
default, without citing any evidence in the record which could create a triable issue. Appellants' 
Brief at 21. They are essentially asking this Court to reweigh the evidence and second guess the 
district court's findings, which it will not do. Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 408, 34 P.3d 
1085, 1091 (2001). Because the district court's findings are supported by substantial, competent 
evidence, they are not clearly erroneous and should not be set aside on appeal. 
2. The district court's findings support its conclusion that 
Houpts' claim/or damages fails as a matter of law. 
Except for Georgia, every jurisdiction to have considered the issue has rejected wrongful 
attempted foreclosure as a theoryofrecovery. E.,g,_, Subramaniam v. Beal, No. 3: 12-cv-01681-MO, 
2013 WL 5462339, *3 (D.Or., Sept. 27, 2013): 
Oregon recognizes a cause of action for the wrongful foreclosure of 
a trust deed ... only where the foreclosure has actually occurred. Ms. 
Subramaniam's claim . . . is moot because her house was not 
foreclosed upon. Because no foreclosure occurred, there is no 
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controversy about whether it was fraudulent or wrongful, and the 
court cannot provide any relief. Oregon does not recognize a cause 
of action for wrongful attempted foreclosure, so Ms. Subramaniam's 
allegation that a potentially wrongful foreclosure was threatened or 
attempted does not give rise to a cause of action. 
See also Edwards v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 24 F. Supp. 3d 21, 31 (D.D.C. 2014)(holding no 
claim for wrongful foreclosure exists where the grantor voluntarily sells his property); Vawter v. 
Quality Loan Serv. Corp. of Wash., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Rosenfeld v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 952,961 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (affirming dismissal of a 
wrongful foreclosure claim where "there is no dispute that a foreclosure sale did not take place"); 
55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 451 ("There is no cause of action for an attempted wrongful 
foreclosure"). In Georgia, the claim is recognized only as one for slander of title. U, Bates v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 768 F.3d 1126, 1134 (11th Cir. 2014) ("the plaintiff must prove a 
knowing and intentional publication of untrue and derogatory information concerning the debtor's 
financial condition, and that damages were sustained as a direct result of this publication"). 
The district court concluded Houpts cannot pursue a claim for wrongful attempted 
foreclosure "where such a cause of action is not allowed by law." R. Vol. IV, p. 761. Houpts argue 
the court erred but do not cite any authority which supports their theory of recovery. The four cases 
Houpts do cite are inapposite. 
In Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp.v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d 429 (2006), the 
purchaser at a trustee's sale ("Freddie Mac") brought an ejectment action against the grantor (Appel). 
The district court granted Freddie Mac's motion for summary judgment. Appel appealed, arguing 
that the rescheduled trustee's sale (which had been postponed by Appel's bankruptcy) was not 
11 
properly noticed. The issues on appeal were (a) whether the district court had relied on the correct 
notice statute in granting summary judgment to Freddie Mac, and (b) whether Freddie Mac was a 
good faith purchaser for value regardless of whether the notice requirements were satisfied. This 
Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded for further fact finding. 143 Idaho at 47, 137 
P.3d at 434. Appel is inapposite because here, no trustee's sale ever occurred. 
Houpts' reliance on Arabia v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 678 (Cal. 
App. 2012) and Schroeder v. Excelsior Management Group, LLC, 297 P.3d 677 (Wash. 2013) is 
similarly misplaced. Neither case recognizes a claim for wrongful attempted foreclosure. The court 
in Arabia affirmed a summary judgment in judicial foreclosure in favor of a loan servicer, rejecting 
the grantor's argument that the servicer lacked standing. 208 Cal. App. 4th at 477. The court in 
Schroeder held that a Washington statute requiring deeds of trust against agricultural land to be 
foreclosed judicially cannot be waived by contract. It vacated the dismissal of the grantor's statutory 
claim for damages and remanded for a determination whether the property was agricultural. 297 
P .3d at 687. The one case Houpts quote is an inapposite, unreported opinion issued by the California 
Court of Appeal, which that court expressly designated as noncitable. Appellants' Brief at 19. 
Even if Idaho were to follow Georgia, Houpts cannot prevail on appeal. They failed to 
produce evidence on summary judgment or allege in their Complaint that their loan was not in 
default when the foreclosure commenced. ,E&, Aetna Fin. Co. v. Culpepper, 320 S.E.2d 228,232 
(Ga. App. 1984) (holding a claim for wrongful attempted foreclosure failed where plaintiff neither 
alleged nor proved any special damages arising from a false publication). Regardless of the standard 
of review, Houpts have failed to demonstrate reversible error by the district court. 
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D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Applying 
Judicial Estoppel To Bar Houpts' Claim For Damages. 
Judicial estoppel bars bankrupts from asserting claims which they omitted from their 
bankruptcy schedules. See, e.g., Eastman v. Union Pac. R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(noting that the "overwhelming majority of cases" apply judicial estoppel in such circumstances); 
Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446,448 (7th Cir. 2006) ("All six courts that have considered this 
question hold that a debtor in bankruptcy who denies owning an asset, including a chose in action 
or other legal claim, cannot realize on that concealed asset after the bankruptcy ends"); Payless 
Wholesale Distrib., Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc., 989 F.2d 570, 571 (1 st Cir. 1993) ("Conceal 
your claims; get rid of your creditors on the cheap, and start over with a bundle ofrights. This is a 
palpable fraud that the court will not tolerate."); Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 
778, 782-86 (9th Cir.2001 ); In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1117 (2000) (holding that a debtor is barred from bringing claims not disclosed in its 
schedules). 
Idaho courts follow the majority rule. Mowrey v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 155 Idaho 629, 
634, 315 P .3d 817, 822 (2013) (holding there is no "good faith" exception to judicial estoppel even 
if debtors were ignorant of disclosure requirements in bankruptcy and their legal counsel failed 
them); McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho at 897,303 P.3d at 900 (2013) ("very clear and very heavy 
authority hold[ s] that judicial estoppel will apply to interests not disclosed in a prior bankruptcy"); 
A & J Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,688, 116 P.3d 12, 18 (2005). 
The district court, perceiving the matter as one of discretion, found McCallister to be 
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dispositive: 
The Houpts had knowledge of their action against [Wells Fargo] at 
least by the time they filed their Verified Complaint on June 22, 2012. 
The Houpts had sufficient opportunity to amend their asset schedules 
... prior to the closing of the bankruptcy case. As noted by the court 
in McCallister, it is immaterial whether Houpts intended to conceal 
the claim. Because the Houpts knew of their claim prior to the close 
of the bankruptcy case, they are now judicially estopped from 
pursuing this litigation. 
R. Vol. V, pp. 853, 862. The district court thus acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the standards set forth in McCallister, and reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 
Houpts argue McCallister is distinguishable and the district court erred in following it. 
There, the plaintiff (Doherty) filed a malpractice suit against his physician (Dixon), alleging Dixon's 
negligence nearly two years earlier had caused Doherty to lose an eye. In the interim, Doherty had 
filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Doherty did not disclose his claim against Dixon in his 
bankruptcy schedules prior to receiving his discharge. 
On summary judgment, Dixon raised Doherty's failure to disclose his claim in bankruptcy. 
Doherty responded by reopening his bankruptcy case, amending his schedules to list the lawsuit as 
an asset, and joining his chapter 13 trustee (McCallister) as a party plaintiff. Doherty argued his 
failure to disclose the lawsuit was a good-faith mistake which he had cured. The district court was 
not persuaded and ruled judicial estoppel barred Doherty's claim against Dixon. 
McCallister appealed, arguing a good faith exception to judicial estoppel applied because 
Doherty did not intend to conceal the lawsuit. This Court unanimously affirmed, holding that "the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it properly recognized judicial estoppel as applicable 
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to situations of non-disclosure of an asset in an earlier bankruptcy proceeding." 154 Idaho at 89 5, 
3 03 P .3d at 582. The Court noted that Doherty' s subjective intent was immaterial: "Judicial estoppel 
'takes into account ... what the [ estopped] party knew, or should have known.'" Id. (quoting Heinze 
v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232,236, 178 P.3d 597,601 (2008)). Specifically, with reference to bankruptcy 
debtors, the Court stated, "Judicial estoppel will be imposed when the debtor has knowledge of 
enough facts to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the bankruptcy, 
but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause of action as a 
contingent asset." Id. (quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 
2002)). 
Houpts contend McCallister is distinguishable because, unlike Doherty, Houpts were not 
aware of their claims against Wells when they filed their bankruptcy petition. However, "the duty 
to disclose all assets and potential assets continues after the initial filing since a debtor is required 
to amend his or her financial statements if circumstances change." Wood, 141 Idaho 682 at 684, 116 
P.3d at 14. See also Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785 (a debtor's duty to disclose potential claims 
continues for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding); Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, 
978 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying judicial estoppel to bar claims of a bankrupt plaintiff 
where he learned of the facts giving rise to his claims before the bankruptcy case was closed). Thus, 
Houpts rely on a distinction which makes no difference. 
The district court also cited Mowrey in its decision. R. Vol. V, p. 862. Mowrey was issued 
after the parties' summary judgment memoranda were filed. It is more factually similar than 
McCallisterto this case but is even less helpful to Houpts' argument. There, the plaintiff(Mowrey) 
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was injured at a Chevron facility in June 2005 in the course of his employment. He was 
incapacitated and suffered a loss of income as a result of his injuries, leading Mowrey and his wife 
to file a prose Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in September 2005. The attorney who prepared their 
petition and schedules was later disbarred. The schedules did not disclose any claim against 
Chevron. The Mowreys received a discharge of their debts in December 2005. 
In June 2006 the Mowreys' trustee reopened their bankruptcy estate to administer a tax 
refund. In July 2006 - upon advice of a representative from the State Insurance Fund - the 
Mowreys retained an attorney who informed them of their potential claims against Chevron. 
However, the Mowreys did not thereafter amend their schedules. Their bankruptcy case was closed 
again in May 2007. Six weeks later, the Mowreys filed a complaint against Chevron. 
In January 2011, Chevron moved for summary judgment, arguing the Mowreys' claim was 
barred by judicial estoppel. In response, the Mowreys reopened their bankruptcy case, amended their 
schedules, and filed affidavits stating: (a) they had no knowledge of their claim against Chevron 
when they filed their bankruptcy petition; (b) they were unaware the claim needed to be disclosed 
in bankruptcy; and ( c) they did not intentionally conceal it from the bankruptcy court. The district 
court granted Chevron's motion and denied the Mowrey's motion for reconsideration, finding that 
judicial estoppel was warranted by the Mowreys' knowledge of and failure to disclose their claim. 
The Mowreys advanced several arguments on appeal, none of which can be made by Houpts 
in this case. They argued: (a) their failure to list the claim as an asset was an unintentional oversight 
by pro se debtors; (b) judicial estoppel did not apply because Chevron was not a creditor or party 
related to their bankruptcy; ( c) judicial estoppel should not apply because it would preclude 
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Mowreys' creditors from recovering; and (d) Mowreys had cured their non-disclosure. 
This Court again unanimously affirmed. It held the Mowreys were charged with knowledge 
of their claim against Chevron during the pendency of their bankruptcy and therefore "possessed the 
requisite knowledge for the application of judicial estoppel." 155 Idaho at 634, 315 P.3d 821. 
Mowrey is indistinguishable. Its holding illustrates that if the district court there acted within 
the bounds of its discretion, then the district court here certainly did as well. 
The Mowreys acted pro se in their bankruptcy and argued their omission was the result of 
their ignorance. Houpts, on the other hand, were represented by counsel. They cannot escape 
judicial estoppel by blaming their bankruptcy attorney. See Mc Callister, 154 Idaho at 898, 303 P .3d 
585 ("Following the advice of counsel is not the equivalent of inadvertence or mistake"); Eastman, 
493 F.3d at 1159 (plaintiff's "assertion that he simply did not know better and his attorney 'blew it' 
is insufficient to withstand application of the doctrine"). 
Chevron was not Mowreys' creditor and fortuitously avoided liability for Mr. Mowrey's 
injuries, (as did Dixon in McCallister), to the detriment of the Mowrey's bankruptcy creditors. Here, 
Wells Fargo was Houpts' creditor. It is not using estoppel to escape tort liability as Chevron and 
Dixon did. Rather, it prevailed at summary judgment on other grounds. Thus Houpts' bankruptcy 
creditors are not harmed by this result. 
The Mowreys didn't file their complaint against Chevron until after their bankruptcy was 
closed, requiring the courts to infer when the Mowreys' had sufficient knowledge of their claim to 
warrant judicial estoppel. Houpts filed their complaint over a year before their bankruptcy case 
closed. The district court did not rely on inference: "The Houpts had knowledge of their action .. 
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. by the time they filed their Verified Complaint . . . . The Houpts had sufficient opportunity to 
amend their asset schedules . . . . Because the Houpts knew of their claim prior to the close of the 
bankruptcy case, they are now judicially estopped from pursuing this litigation." R. Vol. V, p. 862. 
Finally, Mowreys at least attempted to cure their nondisclosure and argued that they were 
seeking to recover for the benefit of their creditors. Houpts have made no such attempt or argument. 
Moreover, Houpts contend that if they were to defeat Wells Fargo's lien, "the proceeds [ of the 
voluntary sale] should in fact be distributed to them." Appellants' Brief at p. 28, L. 2. 
Here, as in McCallister and Mowrey, Houpts' knowledge of and failure to disclose their 
claim warranted the imposition of judicial estoppel. Houpts have failed to prove any error-let alone 
an abuse of discretion-in the dismissal of their claims for damages. 
E. The District Court's Grant Of Summary Judgment Can Be Affirmed On 
The Alternative Ground That Houpts Lack Standing As The Real Party 
In Interest. 
This Court may uphold decisions on alternate grounds from those stated by the district court 
on summary judgment. E.,_g,_, Shapley v. Centurion Life Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875, 882, 303 P.3d 234, 
241 (2013)(citingMartelv.Bulotti, 138Idaho451,453,65P.3d 192, 194(2003)). In Mowrey.this 
Court also affirmed on grounds the Mowreys were not the real party in interest: 
[T]his cause of action arose from an accident that occurred before the 
Mowreys filed bankruptcy, and the Mowreys had knowledge of this 
asset during the pendency of their bankruptcy. Thus, this claim 
became an asset of the bankruptcy estate, and it was a claim for the 
bankruptcy trustee alone to assert. . .. Therefore, since the Mowreys 
were not a real party in interest, and since the bankruptcy trustee was 
never a party to this case, the district court did not err in dismissing 
this case on the basis that the Mowreys were not the real parties in 
interest .... 
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155 Idaho at 635,315 P.3d at 823. See also McCallister, 154 Idaho at 898,303 P.3d at 585: 
Property that is not disclosed on the asset schedule, or otherwise 
administered by the time the bankruptcy case closes, remains property 
of the bankruptcy estate forever. . . . The trustee of the bankruptcy 
estate is the only party with standing to prosecute causes of action 
belonging to the estate." 
(internal citations omitted). 
Here, the Houpts admit: 
On June 22, 2012, Houpts filed their Complaint requesting 
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, arising out of a 
non-judicial Deed of Trust foreclosure (DOT sale) initiated by 
[Wells]. The Houpts were in bankruptcy at that time .... 
Appellants' Brief at 6 (internal citations omitted). This admission is consistent with the district 
court's findings: 
[Wells Fargo] first initiated foreclosure proceedings on October 18, 
2010. The Houpts filed their bankruptcy schedules and amended 
schedules on February 16, 2011 and April 1, 2011. Neither schedule 
declared any contingent or unliquidated claims of value. On March 
15, 2012, [Wells Fargo] re-initiated foreclosure proceedings after the 
bankruptcy court granted it stay relief. The Houpts filed the Verified 
Complaint in this action on June 2, 2012. The bankruptcy case was 
not closed until September 25, 2013. 
R. Vol. V, p. 862. Once Houpts filed their bankruptcy petition, any existing claim for damages 
became an asset ofHoupts' bankruptcy estate which only their trustee could assert. While the trustee 
did abandon the Property, R. Vol. 3, p. 301, 19, at no time did he abandon Houpts' unscheduled, 
contingent, unliquidated claims against Wells. Those claims therefore remain property ofHoupts' 
bankruptcy estate and this Court may also affirm on grounds Houpts are not the real party in interest. 
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F. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Awarding Attorney 
Fees To Wells. 
I. The court did not err in determining that Wells prevailed 
because Wells obtained the most favorable result available to 
a defendant. 
A defendant is the prevailing party as a matter of law when he obtains dismissal of the 
complaint with prejudice and the plaintiff takes nothing thereby. Daisy Mfg Co., Inc. v. Paintball 
Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 262, 999 P .2d 914, 917 (Ct. App.2000) ( overruled on other grounds, 
BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294,233 P.3d 1216 (2010)). There, this 
Court reversed a trial court's denial of an award of attorney fees to the defendant after a stipulated 
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. It held that dismissal with prejudice, where the plaintiff 
gains no benefit from the litigation, is "the most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved" 
by a defendant. It concluded: 
Although the prevailing party determination is discretionary in nature, 
this discretion must be exercised within the bounds of governing legal 
standards. Under some circumstances application of these standards 
requires a holding that one party is the prevailing party on a particular 
claim as a matter of law. This is such a case, for application of the 
Rule 54( d)(l )(B) factors can lead only to a conclusion that Paintball 
was the prevailing party. 
Id. (citing Holmes v. Holmes, 125 Idaho 784,874 P.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
The district court perceived this issue as one of discretion. R. Vol. V, p. 103 7. It acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and within the standard set forth in Paintball Sports: 
Houpts Complaint was dismissed in its entirety .... Pursuant to [the 
parties'] stipulation, this Court ordered that all proceeds should be 
distributed to [Wells Fargo]. [Wells Fargo] is the prevailing party, as 
against the Houpts. 
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Similarly, all claims against FATCO have been dismissed. 
F ATCO could not have received a better outcome. F ATCO is also a 
prevailing party, as against the Houpts. 
Id pp. 1037-38. The court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason, as it elected to apply and 
follow Paintball Sports. The district court did not abuse its discretion and its prevailing party 
determination should not be disturbed on appeal. 
2. The court acted within its discretion in determining the 
amount of attorney fees to award because it considered and 
applied the factors in lR.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
Attorney fees may be awarded only when provided for by contract or by statute. LR.C.P. 
54(e)(l); Hellarv. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571,682 P.2d 524 (1984). The amount of the award rests 
in the sound discretion of the court and the burden is on the disputing party to show an abuse of 
discretion in the award. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 659, 651 P.2d 923, 924 (1982). 
"Where issues of discretion are involved, an award of attorney fees is proper if the appellant fails to 
make a cogent challenge to the judge's exercise of discretion." Andrews v. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc., 
117 Idaho 195, 197, 786 P.2d 586, 589 (Ct. App. 1990). 
This action arose out of a commercial loan agreement. The loan documents provide that 
Houpts will pay their lender's reasonable attorney fees in the event of a lawsuit. R II, pp. 339, 347, 
18( c ). The district court relied on those provisions as the basis for a fee award, R. Vol. V, pp. 871, 
1041, though it could have also relied upon Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). In determining the award 
amount, the court acted within its discretion and in accordance with applicable legal standards by 
twice applying the factors listed in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). Id. at pp. 872-74, 1043-45. The court reached 
its decisions by an exercise ofreason. Id. at 1045. 
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Houpts argue the district court erred but cite no case authority or any Rule 54(e)(3) factors 
other than "time and labor required" in support. Appellants' Brief at 3 7. Houpts suggest all of 
Wells' attorney fees were incurred enforcing the loan documents and thus the "amount involved" 
(Rule 54(e)(3)(G)) was limited to the principal balance of the Note. Id.; R. Vol. V, p. 936. That 
argument fails to account for fees incurred in defending four separate causes of action, including 
claims for damages whichHoupts valued between$590,000.00 and$725,000.00, R. Vol. V,pp. 958, 
960, and a threatened claim for punitive damages. R. Vol. III, p. 470, n. 11. Houpts have not made 
a cogent challenge to the district court's exercise of discretion. Accordingly, Wells ask this Court 
to affirm the fee award. 
G. Wells Fargo And FATCO Are Entitled To Attorney Fees On Appeal. 
The loan documents provide a basis for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party 
on appeal. R. Vol. II, pp. 339, 347, ,r 8(c). Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) provides an alternate basis. 
~' Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,342 P.3d 907,914 (2015) ("Idaho Code section 12-120(3) 
generally mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial"). 
Reasonable attorney fees may also be awarded to the respondent under§ 12-121 if the Court 
determines that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
Turnerv. Turner, 155 Idaho 819,827,317 P.3d 716, 724 (2013) (holding the statute authorizes a fee 
award where the appellant "failed to develop an argument, offered scarce citation to authority, and 
ignored the aspects of the law unfavorable to him"). See also Chicoine v. Bignall, 127 Idaho 225, 
228, 899 P .2d 43 8, 441 (1995) ( awarding fees because "the law in this area is very clear" and 
appellant presented no cogent argument as to why that law does not apply to him). 
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In both Mowrey and McCallister this Court declined to award attorney fees to the respondent 
because the appellant raised an issue which was previously unsettled in Idaho: 
In McCallister ... this Court declined to grant attorney fees on appeal 
because "[the plaintiff] made a good faith argument that his omission 
was not intentional and therefore fell within the ambit of the 
inadvertence-or-mistake exception. Since this issue is unsettled in 
Idaho and other courts have addressed this exception in terms of 
intentionality, attorney fees will not be awarded." 154 Idaho at 
899-900, 303 P.3d at 586-87. In the present matter the Mowreys 
make the same argument. Because their appeal and briefing was 
filed with the Court before this Court's decision in McCallister, 
the Mowrey's appeal was supported by a good faith legal 
argument. Thus, neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
155 Idaho at 635, 315 P.3d at 823 ( emphasis supplied). 
The issues raised by Houpts have been settled. Houpts' attempt to distinguish McCallister 
ignores its holding and the "very clear and very heavy authority," 154 Idaho at 900,303 P.3d at 587, 
which preceded it. Houpts do not make a cogent or good faith argument why McCallister does not 
apply. Houpts do not even address Mowrey, nor do they argue their omissions in bankruptcy were 
the result of inadvertence or mistake. To the contrary, they acknowledge the choice not to amend 
their bankruptcy schedules has been a deliberate one. R. Vol. V, p. 1008, ,r 5. 
Houpts contend the district court erred in applying judicial estoppel but do not argue that it 
abused its discretion or cite any authority which would support a different result. Nor do Houpts cite 
any authority in support of their arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction, their equitable 
claims are not moot, or that Idaho courts recognize a cause of action for unlawful commencement 
of a foreclosure. Rather, Houpts rely solely on the argument that there was conflicting evidence 
presented below to supp01i their claims. Attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121 are 
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appropriate where the appeal simply invites this Court "to second-guess the trial court on conflicting 
evidence." Turner, 155 Idaho at 827,317 P.3d at 724 (quoting Hoggv. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 
130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). That is what Houpts have done here. Accordingly, Wells are entitled 
to attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court correctly identified and applied the standards for adjudicating Houpts' 
claims on cross motions for summary judgment and for reconsideration, and in applying judicial 
estoppel. Its decisions therefore should be affirmed. 
Dated this 29th day of April 2015. 
PERRY LAW, P.C. ----/ ~ (_ 
By: Trevor L. Hart - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants - Respondents 
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